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The mutual fund industry manages about a quarter of the assets in the U.S. stock market and
thus plays an important role in the U.S. economy. The question of how much control is concentrated
in the hands of the largest players is best quantitatively discussed in terms of the tail behavior of
the mutual fund size distribution. We study the distribution empirically and show that the tail is
much better described by a log-normal than a power law, indicating less concentration than, for
example, personal income. The results are highly statistically significant and are consistent across
fifteen years. This contradicts a recent theory concerning the origin of the power law tails of the
trading volume distribution. Based on the analysis in a companion paper, the log-normality is to be
expected, and indicates that the distribution of mutual funds remains perpetually out of equilibrium.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh,89.75.Da,02.60.Ed
I. INTRODUCTION
As of 2007 the mutual fund industry controlled 23% of
household taxable assets in the United States1. In abso-
lute terms this corresponded to 4.4 trillion USD and 24%
of U.S. corporate equity holdings. Large players such as
institutional investors are known to play an important
role in the market [1]. This raises the question of who
has this influence: Are mutual fund investments concen-
trated in a few dominant large funds, or spread across
many funds of similar size? Are there mutual funds that
are so large that they are “too big to fail”?
This question is best addressed in terms of the behavior
of the upper tail of the mutual fund size distribution.
The two competing hypotheses usually made in studies
of firms are Zipf’s law vs. a lognormal. Zipf’s law means
that the distribution of the size s is a power law with tail
exponent ζs ≈ 1, i.e.
P (s > X) ∼ X−ζs ,
Log-normality means that log s has a normal distribu-
tion, i.e. the density function pLN (s) obeys
p(s) =
1
sσ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (log(s)− µs)
2
2σ2s
)
.
From the point of view of extreme value theory this dis-
tinction is critical, since it implies a completely different
class of tail behavior2. These are both heavy tailed, but
1 Data is taken from the Investment Company Institute’s 2007
fact book available at www.ici.org.
2 According to extreme value theory a probability distribution
can have only four possible types of tail behavior. The first
three correspond to distributions with finite support, thin tails,
and tails that are sufficiently heavy that some of the moments
do not exist, i.e. power laws. The fourth category corresponds
to distributions that in a certain sense do not converge; it is
remarkable that most known distributions fall into one of the
first three categories [2].
Zipf’s law is much more heavy tailed. For a log-normal
all the moments exist, whereas for Zipf’s law none of the
moments exist. For Zipf’s law an estimator of the mean
fails to converge. In practical terms, for mutual funds
this would imply that for any sample size N , with sig-
nificant probability an individual fund can be so large
that it is bigger than all other N − 1 firms combined. In
contrast, for a log-normal, in the limit as N → ∞ the
relative size of a single fund becomes negligible.
This question takes on added meaning because the as-
sumption that mutual funds follow Zipf’s law has been
argued to be responsible for the observed power law dis-
tribution of trading volume [3, 4]. Gabaix et al. have
also asserted that the mutual fund distribution follows
Zipf’s law and have used this in a proposed explanation
for the distribution of price returns [5, 6].
We resolve this empirically using the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) dataset and find that
the equity fund size distribution is much better described
by a log-normal distribution.
Our results are interesting in the broader context of the
literature on firm size. Mutual funds provide a particu-
larly good type of firm to study because there are a large
number of funds and their size is accurately recorded. It
is generally believed that the resulting size distribution
from aggregating across industries has a power law tail
that roughly follows Zipf’s law, but for individual indus-
tries the tail behavior is debated3. A large number of
stochastic process models have been proposed to explain
this4. Our results add support to the notion that for
single industries the distribution is log-normal.
The log-normality of the distribution of mutual funds
is also interesting for what it suggests about the under-
lying processes that determine mutual fund size. In a
3 Some studies have found that the upper tail is a log-normal
[7–13] while others have found a power law [12–14]
4 For past stochastic models see [5, 7, 9, 15–19]
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FIG. 1. The CDF for the mutual fund size s (in millions of
2007 dollars) is plotted with a double logarithmic scale. The
cumulative distribution for funds existing at the end of the
years 1993, 1998 and 2005 are given by the full, dashed and
dotted lines respectively.
Inset: The upper tail of the CDF for the mutual funds existing
at the end of 1998 (dotted line) is compared to an algebraic
relation with exponent −1 (solid line).
companion paper [21] we develop a model for the random
process of mutual fund entry, exit and growth under the
assumption of market efficiency, and show that this gives
a good fit to the data studied here. We show that while
the steady-state solution is a power law, the timescale
for reaching this solution is very slow. Thus given any
substantial non-stationarity in the entry and exit pro-
cesses the distribution will remain in its non-equilibrium
log-normal state. See the discussion in Section V.
II. DATA SET
We analyze the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database5.
The database is survivor bias free as it contains historical
performance data for both active and inactive mutual
funds. We study monthly data from 1991 to 20056 on
all reported equity funds. We define an equity fund as
one whose portfolio consists of at least 80% stocks. The
results are not qualitatively sensitive to this, e.g. we get
essentially the same results even if we use all funds. The
data set has monthly values for the Total Assets Managed
(TASM) by the fund and the Net Asset Value (NAV).
We define the size s of a fund to be the value of the
TASM, measured in millions of US dollars and corrected
for inflation relative to July 2007. Inflation adjustments
are based on the Consumer Price Index, published by the
BLS.
5 The US Mutual Fund Database can be purchased from the Cen-
ter for Research in Security Prices (www.crsp.com).
6 There is data on mutual funds starting in 1961, but prior to
1991 there are very few entries. There is a sharp increase in
1991, suggesting incomplete data collection prior to 1991.
III. IS THE TAIL A POWER LAW?
Despite the fact that the mutual fund industry offers a
large quantity of well-recorded data, the size distribution
of mutual funds has not been rigorously studied. This is
in contrast with other types of firms where the size distri-
bution has long been an active research subject. The fact
that the distribution is highly skewed and heavy tailed
can be seen in Figure 1, where we plot the cumulative
distribution of sizes P (s > X) of mutual fund sizes in
three different years.
A visual inspection of the mutual fund size distribution
suggests that it does not follow Zipf’s law7. In the inset of
Figure 1 we compare the tail for funds with sizes s > 102
million to a power law s−ζs , with ζs = −1. Whereas a
power law corresponds to a straight line when plotted on
double logarithmic scale, the data show substantial and
consistent downward curvature. The main point of this
paper is to make more rigorous tests of the power law vs.
the log-normal hypothesis. These back up the intuitive
impression given by this plot, indicating that the data
are not well described by a power law.
To test the validity of the power law hypothesis we
use the method developed by Clauset et al. [20]. They
use the somewhat strict definition8 that the probability
density function p(s) is a power law if there exists an
smin such that for sizes larger than smin, the functional
form of the density p(s) can be written
p(s) =
ζs
smin
(
s
smin
)−(ζs+1)
, (1)
where the distribution is normalized in the interval
[smin,∞). There are two free parameters smin and ζs.
This crossover size smin is chosen such that it minimizes
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic D, which is the
distance between the CDF of the empirical data Pe(s)
and that of the fitted model Pf (s), i.e.
D = max
s≥smin
|Pe(s)− Pf (s)| .
Using this procedure we estimate ζs and smin for the
years 1991- 2005 as shown in Table I. The values of
ζs computed in each year range from 0.78 to 1.36 and
average ζ¯s = 1.09± 0.04. If indeed these are power laws
this is consistent with Zipf’s law. But of course, merely
7 Previous work on the size distribution of mutual funds by Gabaix
et al. [5, 6, 19] argued for a power law while we argue here for a
log-normal.
8 In extreme value theory a power law is defined as any function
that in the limit s → ∞ can be written p(s) = g(s)s−(ζs+1)
where g(s) is a slowly varying function. This means it satisfies
lims→∞ g(ts)/g(s) = C for any t > 0, where C is a positive
constant. The test for power laws in reference [20] is too strong
in the sense that it assumes that there exists an s0 such that for
s > s0, g(s) is constant.
3computing an exponent and getting a low value does not
mean that the distribution is actually a power law.
To test the power law hypothesis more rigorously we
follow the Monte Carlo method utilized by Clauset et
al. Assuming independence, for each year we generate
10, 000 synthetic data sets, each drawn from a power law
with the empirically measured values of smin and ζs. For
each data-set we calculate the KS statistic to its best
fit. The p-value is the fraction of the data sets for which
the KS statistic to its own best fit is larger than the KS
statistic for the empirical data and its best fit.
The results are summarized in Table I. The power law
hypothesis is rejected with two standard deviations or
more in six of the years and rejected at one standard de-
viation or more in twelve of the years (there are fifteen
in total). Furthermore there is a general pattern that as
time progresses the rejection of the hypothesis becomes
stronger. We suspect that this is because of the increase
in the number of equity funds. As can be seen in Ta-
ble I, the total number of equity funds increases roughly
linearly in time, and the number in the upper tail Ntail
also increases.
We conclude that the power law tail hypothesis is ques-
tionable but cannot be unequivocally rejected in every
year. Stronger evidence against it comes from compari-
son to a log-normal, as done in the next section.
IV. IS THE TAIL LOG-NORMAL?
A visual comparison between the two hypotheses can
be made by looking at the Quantile Quantile (QQ) plots
for the empirical data compared to each of the two hy-
potheses. In a QQ-plot we plot the quantiles of one distri-
bution as the x-axis and the other’s as the y-axis. If the
two distributions are the same then we expect the points
to fall on a straight line. Figure 2 compares the two hy-
potheses, making it clear that the log-normal is a much
better fit than the power law. For the log-normal QQ
plot most of the large values in the distribution fall on
the dashed line corresponding to a log-normal distribu-
tion, though the very largest values are somewhat above
the dashed line. This says that the empirical distribu-
tion decays slightly faster than a log-normal. There are
two possible interpretations of this result: Either this is a
statistical fluctuation or the true distribution really has
slightly thinner tails than a log-normal. In any case, since
a log-normal decays faster than a power law, it strongly
suggests that the power law hypothesis is incorrect and
the log-normal distribution is a better approximation.
A more quantitative method to address the question of
which hypothesis better describes the data is to compare
the likelihood of the observation in both hypotheses [20].
We define the likelihood for the tail of the distribution to
be
L =
∏
sj≥smin
p(sj).
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FIG. 2. A Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot for the upper tail
of the size distribution of equity funds. The quantiles are the
base ten logarithm of the fund size, in millions of dollars. The
empirical quantiles are calculated from the size distribution
of funds existing at the end of the year 1998. The empirical
data were truncated from below such that only funds with size
s ≥ smin were included in the calculation of the quantiles. (a)
A QQ-plot with the empirical quantiles as the x-axis and the
quantiles for the best fit power law as the y-axis. The power
law fit for the data was done using the maximum likelihood
described in Section III, yielding smin = 1945 and α = 1.107.
(b) A QQ-plot with the empirical quantiles as the x-axis and
the quantiles for the best fit log-normal as the y-axis, with
the same smin as in (a). The log-normal fit for the data was
done used the maximum likelihood estimation given smin (2)
yielding µ = 2.34 and σ = 2.5.
We define the power law likelihood as
LPL =
∏
sj≥smin
pPL(sj) with the probability den-
sity of the power law tail given by (1). The lognormal
likelihood is defined as LLN =
∏
sj≥smin
pLN (sj) with
the probability density of the lognormal tail given by
pLN(s) =
p(s)
1− P (smin) (2)
=
√
2
s
√
piσ
[
erfc
(
ln smin − µ√
2σ
)]−1
exp
[
− (ln s− µ)
2
2σ2
]
.
The more probable that the empirical sample is drawn
from a given distribution, the larger the likelihood for
that set of observations. The ratio indicates which dis-
tribution the data are more likely drawn from. We define
the log likelihood ratio as
R = ln
(
LPL
LLN
)
. (3)
For each of the years 1991 to 2005 we computed the max-
imum likelihood estimators for both the power law fit
and the log-normal fit to the tail, as explained above and
in Section III. Using the fit parameters, the log like-
lihood ratio was computed and the results are summa-
rized graphically in Figure 3 and in Table I. The ratio
is always negative, indicating that the likelihood for the
log-normal hypothesis is greater than that of the power
law hypothesis in every year. It seems clear that tails
of the mutual fund data are much better described by a
log-normal than by a power law.
4variable 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 mean std
R -0.50 -1.35 -1.49 -1.71 -3.29 -18.42 -2.25 -1.29 -6.57 -4.96 -2.63 -2.95 -2.00 -1.05 -0.99 -3.43 4.45
N 372 1069 1509 2194 2699 3300 4253 4885 5363 5914 6607 7102 7794 8457 8845 - -
E[s] (mn) 810 385 480 398 448 527 559 619 748 635 481 335 425 458 474 519 134
Std[s] (bn) 1.98 0.99 1.7 1.66 1.68 2.41 2.82 3.38 4.05 3.37 2.69 1.87 2.45 2.64 2.65 2.42 0.8
E[ω] 5.58 4.40 4.40 3.86 3.86 3.91 3.84 3.85 4.06 3.97 3.60 3.37 3.55 3.51 3.59 3.96 0.54
Std[ω] 1.51 1.98 2.09 2.43 2.50 2.46 2.50 2.51 2.46 2.45 2.63 2.42 2.49 2.59 2.50 2.34 0.29
ζs 1.33 1.36 1.19 1.15 1.11 0.78 1.08 1.10 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.14 1.09 0.14
smin 955 800 695 708 877 182 1494 1945 1147 903 728 836 868 1085 1383 974 408
Ntail 81 129 232 256 280 1067 290 283 557 662 717 494 652 630 550 - -
p-value 0.58 0.48 0.02 0.45 0.07 0 0.01 0.11 5 10−4 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.19
TABLE I. Table of monthly parameter values for equity funds defined such that the portfolio contains a fraction of at least 80% stocks. The values for each of the
monthly parameters (rows) were calculated for each year (columns). The mean and standard deviation are evaluated for the monthly values in each year.
R - the base 10 log likelihood ratio of a power law fit relative to a log-normal fit as given by equation (3). A negative value of R indicates that the log-normal
hypothesis is a likelier description than a power law. For all years the value is negative meaning that the log-normal distribution is more likely.
N - the number of equity funds existing at the end of each year.
E[ω] - the mean log size of funds existing at the end of each year.
Std[ω] - the standard deviation of log sizes for funds existing at the end of each year.
E[s] - the mean size (in millions) of funds existing at the end of each year.
Std[s] - the standard deviation of sizes (in billions) for funds existing at the end of each year.
ζs - the power law tail exponent (1).
smin - the lower tail cutoff (in millions of dollars) above which we fit a power law (1).
Ntail - the number of equity funds belonging to the upper tail s.t. s ≥ smin.
p-value - the probability of obtaining a goodness of fit at least as bad as the one calculated for the empirical data, under the null hypothesis of a power law upper tail.
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FIG. 3. A histogram of the base 10 log likelihood ratios R
computed using (3) for each of the years 1991 to 2005. A
negative log likelihood ratio implies that it is more likely that
the empirical distribution is log-normal then a power law. The
log likelihood ratio is negative in every year, in several cases
strongly so.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF LOG-NORMALITY
The log-normal nature of the size distribution has im-
portant implications on the role investor behavior plays
in the mutual fund industry. Is the size distribution of
mutual funds, i.e. the concentration of assets, determined
through investor choice or is it just a consequence of the
random nature of the market? In a companion paper [21]
we propose that the size distribution can be explained
by a simple random process model. This model, char-
acterizing the entry, exit and growth of mutual funds as
a random process, is based on market efficiency, which
dictates that fund performance is size independent and
fund growth is essentially random. This model provides
a good explanation of the concentration of assets, sug-
gesting that other effects, such as transaction costs or
the behavioral aspects of investor choice, play a smaller
role.
The fact that the fund distribution is a log-normal is
interesting because, as we argue in the companion paper,
this indicates a very slow convergence toward equilib-
rium. There we find a time-dependent solution for the
underlying random process of mutual fund entry, exit,
and growth, and show that the size distribution evolves
from a log-normal towards a Zipf power law distribution.
However, the relaxation to the steady-state solution is ex-
tremely slow, with time scales on the order of a century or
more. Given that the mutual fund industry is still young,
the distribution remains in its non-equilibrium state as
a log-normal. Furthermore, given that the properties of
the entry and exit processes are not stable over long pe-
riods of time, the non-equilibrium log-normal state will
very likely persist indefinitely.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown in unequivocal terms that the mutual
fund size distribution is much closer to a log-normal than
to a power law. Thus, while the distribution is concen-
trated, it is not nearly as concentrated as it might be.
Among other things this suggests that that the power law
distribution observed for trading volume by Gopikrish-
nan et al. [22] cannot be explained based on a power law
distribution for funds. The companion paper discussed
in the previous section [21] constructs a theory that ex-
plains the log-normality based on the random nature of
the mutual fund entry, exit and growth, and the very
long-time scales required for convergence to the steady-
state power law solution.
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